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This paper proposes a simple model to study the relationship between domestic institutions - financial
system, corporate governance, and property rights protection - and patterns of international capital
flows. It studies conditions under which financial globalization can be a substitute for reforms of domestic
financial system. Inefficient financial system and poor corporate governance in a country may be completely
bypassed by two-way capital flows in which domestic savings leave the country in the form of financial
capital outflows but domestic investment takes place via inward foreign direct investment. While financial
globalization always improves the welfare of a developed country with a good financial system, its
effect is ambiguous for a developing country with an inefficient financial sector/poor corporate governance.
However, the net effect for a developing country is more likely to be positive, the stronger its property
rights protection. This is consistent with the observation that developed countries are often more enthusiastic
about capital account liberalization around the world than many developing countries. A noteworthy
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Cross-border capital ﬂows have been increasing in real value at a pace of about
6 percent a year since 1980, faster than those of world GDP and trade. The
progress has been particularly rapid since 1990 (though with a temporary dip during
1997-2002). This reﬂects falling barriers to capital ﬂows in many parts of the world.
Yet, the composition varies across countries. Many developing countries (e.g., China,
Malaysia, and South Africa) are net importers of foreign direct investment (FDI) on
the one hand, but net exporters of ﬁnancial capital on the other. Many developed
countries (e.g., France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) do the reverse,
exporting FDI but importing ﬁnancial capital.
Consider the example of China. Its large and growing current account surplus
implies that it is exporting capital on net to the rest of the world, especially to
the United States. At the same time, it is a top recipient of FDI in the world,
with an amount in excess of 50 billion US dollars in 2005. While traditional
explanations for its large inward FDI center on China’s cheap labor and large market,
MIT political scientist Yasheng Huang (2003) suggested a novel and fascinating
hypothesis: the large volume of inward FDI is a reﬂection of China’s inability to
allocate its household savings eﬃciently through its ﬁnancial sector, rather than
its economic strength. FDI eﬀectively serves as a tool for Chinese private ﬁrms to
circumvent the ineﬃcient domestic ﬁnancial sector.1
Two-way capital ﬂows are certainly not unique to China. Table 1 reports
patterns of capital ﬂows for developed countries, emerging market economies, and
other developing countries during 1990-2004 (the most recent period of rapid ﬁnancial
globalization). In 2004, a typical developed country exported 1120 dollars of net
cumulative FDI per person, but imported 1382 dollars of net cumulative ﬁnancial
capital per person. In the same year, a typical emerging market economy did the
1Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) also suggested that multinational ﬁrms are part
of the mechanism for a vast Chinese labor force to be employed successfully in export-oriented
sectors without being dragged down by China’s ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system.
2opposite thing: importing FDI of 1671 dollars per person, but exporting ﬁnancial
capital of $5556 dollars per person. Low income developing countries (“other developing
countries”) imported both FDI and non-FDI but with a much smaller magnitude.
The same qualitative patterns hold in 1990, 1995 and 2000 though the exact dollar
amount varies.
Table 1
This paper proposes a simple theoretical framework to study the relationship
between domestic institutions - ﬁnancial system eﬃciency, corporate governance,
and property rights protection - and patterns of international capital ﬂows. Two-way
capital ﬂows are shown to be a natural consequence of cross-country diﬀerences in
the quality of ﬁnancial system and the strength of corporate governance. In other
words, ﬁnancial globalization allows ineﬃcient domestic ﬁnancial system and weak
corporate governance to be bypassed through a combination of inward FDI and
outward ﬂow of ﬁnancial capital. The paper studies conditions under which two-way
capital ﬂows and the bypassing eﬀect can take place.
To highlight the role of institutions rather than risk sharing motive as a driver
for capital ﬂows, our model assumes that everyone is risk-neutral. By introducing
into an otherwise standard neoclassic framework a ﬁnancial arrangement between
entrepreneurs and investors via a ﬁnancial institution, we derive a sharing rule
of capital revenue by which expected marginal product of capital is divided into
three components: interest rate, cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, and cost of weak
corporate governance. This sharing rule makes explicit the possibility that a developing
country (with a scarcity of capital and a potentially high return to physical capital)
may nonetheless oﬀer a low return to ﬁnancial investment/savings due to the ineﬃciency
of its ﬁnancial sector and the weakness of its corporate governance. Under some
conditions, the country may experience a combination of two-way capital ﬂows:
3exporting savings and importing FDI at the same time. Interestingly, regardless of
the initial endowment, capital ﬂows may always bring two countries with diﬀerent
institutions into a pattern of two-way capital ﬂows.
In contrast to the neoclassical model (as for example in Lucas 1990), our model
also deﬁnes a notion of “eﬀective capital abundance” which determines the size of
net capital ﬂows (while the collective quality of ﬁnancial institutions and corporate
governance determines the composition of gross ﬂows). A country is eﬀectively more
capital abundant if it has either a high ratio of physical capital to labor or a weak
property rights institution. By reducing proﬁtability of investment, weak property
rights protection discourages inward FDI and encourages outﬂow of savings.
The model in this paper makes a somewhat surprising prediction: In a world
free of any barriers to international capital ﬂows, ﬁnancial capital and foreign direct
investment not only move in the opposite directions but also reinforce each other
in a way that would lead to a complete bypass of inferior ﬁnancial institution
and corporate governance. In a sense, removal of barriers to capital mobility
and reforms of domestic ﬁnancial system are substitutes. We realize that this
extreme proposition of a complete bypass eﬀe c tm a yn o tb er e a l i s t i c ,b u tb e l i e v ei ti s
instructive nonetheless. The Modigliani-Miller theorem predicts complete substitutability
between debt and equity as forms of corporate ﬁnancing in a frictionless world,
while the Coase theory predicts complete substitutability between market-based
and within-ﬁrm transactions if there is no transaction cost. Neither is realistic, but
both are considered helpful in clarifying thinking on their respective topics. In our
context, it may be realistic that an open capital account partially makes up for the
shortcomings of an inferior domestic ﬁnancial system and corporate governance.
Capital account liberalization has interesting and country-speciﬁc welfare consequences.
First, from the world’s perspective, as the inferior ﬁnancial institutions are bypassed,
savings in all countries are served by the best ﬁnancial system, and capital is
eﬃciently allocated to equate expected marginal product of capital across all countries.
4The word’s welfare improves unambiguously. Second, the country with a strong
ﬁnancial system also gains unambiguously: not only its domestic savings will receive
a higher return, but also its ﬁnancial institutions and entrepreneurs will reap greater
reward. Third, for the country with an inferior corporate governance/ﬁnancial
system, however, the welfare eﬀect is not clear-cut as it involves a trade-oﬀ between
an eﬃciency gain from free capital mobility on the one hand and a revenue loss by
its ﬁnancial institution and native entrepreneurs on the other. One should note,
however, the stronger the country’s property rights protection, the more likely it
would beneﬁt from capital mobility. These theoretical predictions are consistent
with the observation that the United States and other developed countries tend to be
more enthusiastic about global capital account liberalization than many developing
countries. They are also consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, reviewed in Prasad
et al (2003) and Kose et al (2006), that the strength of domestic property rights
protection in a developing country may aﬀect its ability to beneﬁtf r o mﬁnancial
globalization.
This paper is related to the literature that investigates the implications of
ﬁnancial market imperfection on the direction of international capital ﬂows. A
seminal paper is Gertler and Rogoﬀ (1990) which shows that a moral hazard problem
between foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs may cause capital to be exported
by poor countries to rich ones (contrary to the frictionless neoclassical model).
Other important papers include Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) which focuses on
asymmetric information across countries as an explanation for diﬀerences in real
interest rates, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) which argues that better investor
protection could generate a higher interest rate, Matsuyama (2004, 2005) and Aoki,
Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2006) which study the eﬀects of international credit market
constraint on cross-country capital ﬂows, and Stulz (2005) which studies the dual
agency problems of government and entrepreneurs in limiting the extent of ﬁnancial
globalization. These papers do not study potentially distinct roles of property rights
5protection and ﬁnancial institutions, and do not endogenously generate two-way
capital ﬂows.
Our notion that property rights and ﬁnancial sector institutions could play
diﬀerent roles in determining patterns of capital ﬂo w si sm o s tc l o s e l yr e l a t e dt o
the work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who, inspired by North (1981), provide
a seminal empirical contribution that unbundles property rights and contracting
institutions. The former is found to have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on long-run growth,
while the second appears to matter mainly for ﬁnancial development.
Several recent papers look into the composition of capital ﬂows. Goldstein and
Razin (2006) and Razin and Sadka (2007) use information asymmetry to highlight
at r a d e - o ﬀ between foreign direct investment and portfolio investment. Caballero,
Farhi, and Gourinchas (2005) show that an exogenously speciﬁed low capacity to
generate ﬁnancial assets in a country reduces the interest rate in that country.
Antras, Desai, and Foley (2006) relate the choice of a multinational ﬁrm between
licensing a technology to foreign producers versus engaging in FDI to the strength
of property rights protection in the host country (though they treat property rights
protection and ﬁnancial development as the same thing). Using a dynamic general
equilibrium model with an incomplete asset market, Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull
(2007) show that a country with a high level of ﬁnancial development may have a
negative net foreign asset position but a still positive position in foreign productive
asset. These papers still do not distinguish property rights protection and ﬁnancial
institutions, and do not investigate the conditions under which global capital ﬂows
may lead to a complete bypass of ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system and poor corporate
governance.
Several empirical papers links domestic institutions to international capital ﬂows,
including Wei (2000a and 2000b) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2005).
These papers do not explore separate roles of diﬀerent institutions and do not study
the bypass eﬀect of capital ﬂows. Two recent empirical papers are particularly
6relevant for the current paper. Wei (2006) investigates separate roles of property
rights protection and ﬁnancial development in the composition of capital ﬂows. He
ﬁnds that, conditional on the quality of property rights protection, more ﬁnancial
development tends to reduce inward FDI but increase gross inﬂows of ﬁnancial
capital. Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) ﬁnd that aggregate capital appears
to ﬂow “upstream,” i.e., from poor to rich countries, while FDI does go “downstream,”
from rich to poor countries. The theory developed in this paper may provide a
starting point to explain these empirical patterns.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Sections 3
studies the benchmark case with zero barrier to capital ﬂows and shows a complete
bypass of inferior domestic ﬁnancial system through two-way capital ﬂows as the
unique equilibrium. Section 4 then extends the model to allow for a variety of
frictions and discusses comparative statics. Section 5 analyses the welfare consequences
of international capital ﬂows. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Let us start with a closed economy. Two factors, labor and capital, are used
for producing a good which is used for both consumption and investment. The
endowments of labor and capital in the country are L and K. The production
function of the good exhibits constant returns to scale and takes the form of y =
F(l,z) where l and z are labor and capital usages by the ﬁrm, respectively. The
wage rate and the interest rate (the return to ﬁnancial capital) are denoted by w
and r, respectively. The product market is perfectly competitive and the good price
is normalized to one.
The production process is assumed to take two periods. There are K number
of capitalists, each born with 1 unit of capital and facing an endogenous choice of
becoming either an entrepreneur or a ﬁnancial investor at the beginning of the ﬁrst
7period. If a capitalist chooses to be an entrepreneur, she would manage one project,
investing her 1 unit of capital (labeled as internal capital) and raising x amount
of additional capital (external capital) from ﬁnancial investors, possibly through a
ﬁnancial institution. The total investment in the ﬁrm is the sum of internal and
external capital, or z =1 + x.L e tN denote the number of ﬁrms (or entrepreneurs) in
the market. Since all ﬁrms are symmetric, the economy-wide capital stock K = Nz.
Full employment of labor would ensure that each ﬁrm hires l = z (L/K) amount of
labor.
After the investment decision is made in the ﬁrst period, production and consumption
take place in the second period. Let depreciation rate be zero. If the project





k(1,K/L) and w = F0
l(1,K/L) (1)








z = wl + Rz (2)
Thus, the ﬁrm earns zero proﬁt. The gross return to one unit of investment
R, however, has to be sliced and shared among ﬁnancial investors, the ﬁnancial
intermediary, and the entrepreneur. The CRS production function implies that the
ﬁrm could borrow unlimited of capital if the capital market were perfect. A moral
hazard problem that we introduce next, however, results in credit rationing to the
entrepreneur.
We use a framework of moral hazard that is derived and simpliﬁed from Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997) to parameterize ﬁnancial sector eﬃciency. More precisely, entrepreneurs,
8whose own capital endowment is insuﬃcient for the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial need, obtain
external ﬁnancing indirectly through an ﬁnancial intermediation sector from ﬁnancial
investors. Our main extension to the model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) is
to let the total return per unit of capital, R, be endogenously determined by
country’s characteristics of endowment and institution, which allows us to study
international capital ﬂows, whereas Holmstrom and Tirole set R as exogenously
given. In addition, while Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) also study the investment by
ﬁnancial intermediaries, we don’t. On the other hand, we let agents endowed with
capital to endogenously choose to be either a ﬁnancial investor or an entrepreneur,
but Holmstrom and Tirole don’t.
For a representative ﬁrm, the ﬁnal output depends in part on the entrepreneur’s
l e v e lo fe ﬀort, which can be low or high, but is not observable by the ﬁnancial
investors or the ﬁnancial institution. Assume that the entrepreneur can choose
among two versions of the project. The “Good” version has a high probability
of success, λH, while oﬀe r i n gn op r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt. The “Bad” version has a lower
probability of project success, λL, but oﬀering a private beneﬁtp e ru n i to fc a p i t a l
managed, b, to the entrepreneur. Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we
further assume that only the “Good” project is economically viable. That is,
λHR−(1 + r) > 0 >λ LR−(1 + r)+b so that only “Good” project is implemented
in the moral hazard problem. We normalize λL =0and assume λH = λ thereafter.
The entrepreneur is paid RE per unit of capital to induce her to choose the
“Good” project. In addition to that, we assume that c/θ units of good (but no
capital and labor) are used to intermediate one unit of investment. Thus, the pay
to the ﬁnancial intermediation is c/θ units of good per unit of investment. c/θ may
represent the transaction cost, the monitoring cost to reduce the extent of moral
hazard, or the expropriation by government oﬃcials. The eﬃciency level of the
ﬁnancial system in the country is then represented by θ. The higher the θ,t h e
lower is the ﬁnancial intermediation cost.
9Other than the ﬁnancial system, the strength of property rights protection, or the
control of the risk of expropriation, also plays an important role in this model. One
could conveniently think of a higher value of λ in our model as representing better
property rights protection (or lower expropriation risk). Equivalently, a higher value
of λ also represents a lower tax rate on capital return.
Conditional on the eﬃciency level of the ﬁnancial system, the entrepreneur
chooses the amount of external capital x, her own capital contribution to the project
y, total investment of the project z, and the marginal pay to entrepreneur’s eﬀort
RE to solve the following program:
max
x,y,z,RE U = zλRE +( 1+r)(1− y) (3)
subject to
y ≤ 1 (4)







z ≥ (1 + r)x (6)
λRE ≥ b (7)
The objective function (3) represents entrepreneur’s expected income. The ﬁrst
term represents the entrepreneur’s share in total capital revenue. The second
term is the return from investing her own 1 − y capital in the market. Turning
into the constraints, inequality (4) requires that entrepreneur’s internal capital is
lass than her capital endowment. Inequality (5) requires that total investment
does not exceed the sum of internal and external capitals. Inequality (6) is the
participation constraint for the outside ﬁnancial investors, while inequality (7) is
the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint.
It is then straightforward to show that all constraints must be binding in equilibrium.2
2The problem is solved by setting the Lagrangian, and then straightforward manipulation of
10The entrepreneur will invest all her endowment y =1in the ﬁrm. The total
investment z equals the sum of internal and external capitals x +1 . The incentive





The investors’ participation constraint (6) is binding. Substituting (8) into (6) gives
the ﬁrm’s optimal investment3
z =
1+r
(1 + r)+c/θ + b − λR
(9)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (3), the entrepreneur’s expected income becomes
U =
b(1 + r)
(1 + r)+c/θ + b − λR
(10)
2.1 A Sharing Rule on Return to Physical Capital
We assume that a capitalist (a potential entrepreneur) needs to pay a ﬁxed entry
cost of f units of goods to become an entrepreneur.4 With free entry and exit of
entrepreneurs, the entrepreneur’s expected income,U ,should be equal to (1 + r)(1+f)
so that capitalists are indiﬀerent between becoming entrepreneurs or ﬁnancial investors
in equilibrium. That is,
the ﬁrst order conditions shows that (4), (5), (6), and (7) must bind.
3Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we rule out the case that (1 + r)+c/θ + b − λR < 0
in which the ﬁrm would want to invest without limit.
4For expositional convenience, we assume that the ﬁxed fee for becoming an entrepreneur is
due only in the second period so it does not reduce entrepreneur’s capital endowment in the ﬁrst
period. The schedule in the ﬁrst period could specify that the payment in the second period is
equal to
f(1+r)
λ if the project succeeds, and zero otherwise, so that the expected present value of
the fee is exactly f.
11U =
b(1 + r)
(1 + r)+c/θ + b − λR
=( 1+r)(1+f) ⇔






1+f denotes the average net pay to the entrepreneur. To see this, note
that U = bz =( 1+r)(1+f). Thus, b =( 1+f)(1+r)/z. Using this result, we
have β = f(1 + r)/z and note that the entrepreneur’s expected return net of the
opportunity cost of her own endowment, U − (1 + r)=f(1 + r).
For a given value of f, the higher the private beneﬁt b, the higher the β.
Therefore, one could think of β as a measure of the inferiority of corporate governance.
That is, the higher β, the lower the quality of corporate governance. The equation
(11) is a key expression in this model, as it describes how the expected return to the
physical capital is divided up among its usages, which we label as a capital revenue
s h a r i n gr u l e( C R S R ) .The expected marginal product of capital on the left hand
side of the equation, is shared by the return to ﬁnancial investment, 1+r, the cost
of ﬁnancial intermediation, c
θ, and the average net pay to the entrepreneur β.T h e
lower the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial sector (as reﬂected by a higher c
θ or a lower θ),
or the poorer the corporate governance (as reﬂected by a higher β), the lower is the
return to ﬁnancial investment in the economy. In other words, in spite of a scarcity
of capital in a developing country (which normally implies a high return to physical
capital), the return on savings and other ﬁnancial investment may very well be low
if the country’s ﬁnancial sector is ineﬃcient or the corporate governance is weak.
3 Capital Flows with No Frictions
Consider capital ﬂows between countries i and j.5 They diﬀer in the eﬃciency level
of ﬁnancial system, θ, the strength of property rights protection, λ, the average net
5We use superscripts i and j to denote variables of countries i and j, respectively.
12pay to the entrepreneur, β, and endowments L and K. For ease of keeping track, let
us make country i to have a relatively low capital-to-labor ratio, low ﬁnancial sector
eﬃciency, and weak corporate governance, i.e., a typical developing country. There
are two types of international capital ﬂows in this model. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) goes to where the expected return to an entrepreneur is the highest. It takes
place when the entrepreneur decides to take her project (and her capital managed)
to a foreign country and use foreign labor to produce. Non-FDI or ﬁnancial capital
ﬂow goes to where the interest rate is the highest; it occurs when a ﬁnancial investor
decides to take her endowment out of the country and invests in a foreign ﬁnancial
system. Labor is assumed to be immobile across countries.
We will proceed sequentially. We ﬁrst study a case in which only ﬁnancial capital
ﬂow is allowed, and then a case in which only foreign direct investment is allowed.
We then study the general case in which both types of capital ﬂows can take place.
3.1 Financial Capital Flows
Let Ki0(Kj0) be the capital stock in country i(j), respectively, before any cross-border
capital ﬂows, while Ki and Kj be the capital stocks in the two countries after the
capital ﬂows. Financial capital will ﬂow from i to j i fa n do n l yi fri <r j. We
assume that free trade in goods equalizes the price of good across countries, which















.ρ i i st h es u mo ft h ec o s to fﬁnancial intermediation and the
average net pay to the entrepreneur and is referred to as the collective agency costs.
Higher ρi represents lower collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate
governance in country i. Equation (12) is labeled as a boundary condition for
ﬁnancial capital ﬂows (FCF). Let ki = Ki/Li, which is represented by horizontal
13axis in Figure 1, while kj is represented by vertical axis. The FCF curve in Figure
1 represents condition (12).
We assume that F0
k(1,0) = ∞. The curve FCF starts from origin and is upward
sloping. The position of curve FCF is determined by the value of λi, λj, and ρj−ρi.
If ρj − ρi becomes smaller, or λi/λj becomes smaller, the curve FCF shifts to the
left. A point in the space, (ki,kj), represents capital-labor ratios in two countries.
ri <r j f o ra n yp o i n to nt h er i g h ts i d eo ft h eFCF curve so that ﬁnancial capital
ﬂows out of country i. On the other hand, ﬁnancial capital ﬂows into country i from
country j for any point on the left side of the FCF curve.
If country i is poor, that is, Ki/Li <K j/Lj, the marginal product of capital in
country i, F0
k(1,Ki/Li), is higher than that in rich country, F0
k(1,Kj/Lj).H o w e v e r ,
if country i has lower quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance
(ρi >ρ j), or worse property rights protection
¡
λi <λ j¢
, (ki,kj) could be in the
right side of FCF curve. Hence the interest rate in country i could be lower.
Therefore, an ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system or a poor corporate governance can result
in ﬁnancial capital to ﬂow from poor to rich countries (as found in Prasad, Rajan,
and Subramanian, 2006).
3.2 Foreign Direct Investment
FDI takes place when an entrepreneur decides she can earn a higher return by
moving her project to a foreign location. We assume that the entrepreneur still uses
her native ﬁnancial system only and pay the domestic interest rate. In other words,
if a U.S. multinational ﬁrm operates in India, the US ﬁrm still uses a US bank or
stock market for its ﬁnancing need. When the entrepreneur in country i directly





(1 + ri)+c/θi + bi − λjRj (13)
14The entrepreneur produces abroad if and only if Uid >U i, which holds if and only










This deﬁnes a boundary condition for the direction of foreign direct investment
(FDI). The condition (14) is indicated by the curve FDI in Figure 1. For any point
on the right side of the FDI c u r v ew eh a v eλjRj >λ iRi so that FDI ﬂows out
of country i, while for any point on the left side of the FDI curve FDI ﬂows into
country i from country j.
3.3 Capital Bypass Circulation
We now allow both types of capital ﬂows. The patterns of bilateral capital ﬂows
are determined by conditions (12) and (14). Let ρi >ρ j so that country i has a
less eﬃcient ﬁnancial system or weaker corporate governance than country j. In this
case, the curve FCF must be above the curve FDI.6
We will show that, without frictions to capital ﬂows, the unique equilibrium in
the world capital market is a complete capital bypass circulation in which all capital
owned by country i leaves the country in the form of ﬁnancial capital outﬂow, but
physical capital (and projects) reenters in the form of FDI. The lower quality of
ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance in country i is completely bypassed.
When the collective agency costs in country i, ρi, is higher than that in country
j, ρj, there will be a two-way capital ﬂow area where ρj − ρi <λ jRj − λiRi < 0,
which is represented by the area between curves FCF and FDI in Figure 1. Within
the area the expected marginal product of capital is higher in country i than that
in country j, but the interest rate which equals the diﬀerence between the expected
6If ρ
i = ρ
j,F C Fand FDI coincide so that ﬁnancial capital and FDI always ﬂow in the same
direction. Furthermore, if λ
i = λ
j,F C Fand FDI become the straight line at 45-degree. We are
back to the prediction of neoclassical model that capital ﬂo w sf r o mr i c ht op o o rc o u n t r i e s .
15marginal product of capital and the collective agency costs is higher in country j
than that in country i. Thus FDI ﬂows from j to i, but ﬁnancial capital ﬂows from
i to j in the area.
The high-ρ country sends out ﬁnancial capital to escape the low home interest
rate, and at the same time, receives the inward FDI due to the high domestic return
to physical capital. The key insight of the complete capital bypass circulation is that
FDI inﬂow and ﬁnancial capital outﬂow reinforce each other so that in equilibrium
a corner solution must occur. Let capital/labor ratio of two countries before capital
ﬂows, (ki0,kj0), be between curves FCF and FDI, as indicated by point C in
Figure 1. The outﬂow of ﬁnancial capital from i to j increases the marginal product
of capital in i but decreases the marginal product of capital in j, which results in
more FDI ﬂowing from j to i. On the other hand, FDI ﬂowing from j to i decreases
the marginal product of capital in i, which reduces the interest rate and therefore
results in more outﬂow of ﬁnancial capital from i to j. Such capital bypass circulation
continues until all ﬁnancial capital owned by country i leaves the country, and the
less eﬃcient ﬁnancial institution is completely bypassed.
If the autarky capital/labor ratio, (ki0,kj0), is on the left side of FDI curve, as
indicated by point A in Figure 1, then country i is labor abundant. Since A is to
the left of FDI curve, FDI will ﬂow into i from j until FCF is reached. Although
A is also to the left of FCF curve, expecting that the ﬂow of FDI from j to i would
eventually bring (ki,kj) to the right side of FCF curve and make ﬁnancial capital
ﬂo w i n gi n t oc o u n t r yi not proﬁtable, ﬁnancial capital does not ﬂow into country i in
the ﬁrst place. When (ki,kj) crosses FCF curve, it enters into the two-way capital
ﬂow area. The two-way capital ﬂows will continue until all capital owned by country
i leaves the country. When that happens, no ﬁnancial investor uses the ﬁnancial
sector in country i anymore and all capital in both countries is served by country j’s
ﬁnancial system. Anticipating this scenario, domestic capitalists in country i would
not choose an entrepreneur career either. In this case, all projects in country i will
16be operated by multinational ﬁrms headquartered in country j.
If (ki0,kj0) is on the right side of FCF curve, as indicated by point B in Figure
1, country i is capital abundant. Financial capital ﬂows out of country i into j at
the beginning. Expecting that the outﬂow of ﬁnancial capital from i to j would
eventually bring (ki,kj) t ot h el e f ts i d eo fFDI curve and render FDI ﬂowing out
of country i not proﬁtable, FDI does not ﬂow out of country i in the ﬁrst place.
After (ki,kj) crosses the FDIcurve, the two countries enter into the two-way capital
ﬂow area in which FDI moves from country j into country i, while ﬁnancial capital
ﬂowing from i into j. All capital owned by country i again leaves the country in the
form of ﬁnancial capital outﬂows, but some physical capital (and projects) reenters
the country in the form of FDI.
It is worth noting that the complete-bypass equilibrium is independent from
initial endowment allocation (ki0,kj0). Regardless of whether a country is poor or
rich, all of its ﬁnancial capital will leave the country, with some compensating inﬂow
of FDI, if the collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance in
the country is lower.
While all ﬁnancial capital leaves country i, t h ea m o u n to fF D Iﬂowing into
country i is determined by the FDIcondition (14). The equilibrium, E =( Ki∗/Li,Kj∗/Lj)
is determined by the intersection between the line of Liki + Ljkj = Ki0 + Kj0 and
















Diﬀerentiating the above equation, it can be immediately seen that Ki∗ declines as
λi decreases: a country with worse property rights protection receives less FDI in
the equilibrium.
Using a positive number to represent capital outﬂow, the net ﬁnancial capital
outﬂow equals Ki0 and the net FDI outﬂow equals −Ki∗ in country i. The net overall
17capital ﬂow in country i equals Kin = Ki0 − Ki∗, which is positive if and only if


























We deﬁne country i as eﬀectively capital abundant if condition (16) holds.
Country i is a net exporter of capital if and only if the country is eﬀectively capital
abundant. Note that even if country i is poor (ki0 <k j0), it can be eﬀectively
capital abundant if it has suﬃciently weak property rights protection (λi <λ j). To
s u m m a r i z ew eh a v e :
Proposition 1 (A) In a frictionless world capital market, the unique equilibrium
of capital ﬂow features a complete bypass: all capital originally in the country with
lower collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance leaves the
country in the form of ﬁnancial capital outﬂow, but domestic investment takes place
in the form of FDI. (B) Less FDI goes into a country with worse property rights
protection. (C) A country is a net exporter of capital if and only if it is eﬀectively
capital abundant.
4 Frictions and Capital Flows
It is natural to wonder if the strong result of a complete bypass of the weak domestic
ﬁnancial system/corporate governance is a consequence of the assumption of zero
frictions in the capital market. We now introduce a variety of frictions into the
model. The key message that emerges is that the unique equilibrium of a complete
bypass survives as long as the diﬀerence in collective qualities of ﬁnancial system/corporate
governance between two countries is larger than costs of capital ﬂows. In this case,
the beneﬁto fb y p a s s i n gt h el e s se ﬃcient ﬁnancial institution more than compensates
the costs of capital ﬂows.
18Let τij b et h ec o s tp e ru n i to fﬁnancial capital moving from i to j. It encompasses
the cost of acquiring information, sovereign risk, withholding tax in the host country
and so on. We assume the cost of capital ﬂows is always non-negative. Financial
capital ﬂows from i to j if ri ≤ rj − τij. The condition for ﬁnancial outﬂows









≥ ρj − ρi + τij (17)
The reverse happens if rj ≤ ri − τji.N o t eτjiand τij may not be the same. This









≤ ρj − ρi − τji (18)
The FCF-out curve in Figure 2 represents condition (17) when the equality holds.
At any point on the right side of the FCF-out curve, ﬁnancial capital ﬂows out
of country i. Similarly, FCF-in curve represents condition (18) when the equality
holds. At any point on the left side of FCF-in curve, ﬁnancial capital ﬂows into
country i. Since −τji <τ ij, the FCF-in c u r v em u s tl i ea b o v et h eFCF-out curve.
Let ηij be the cost per unit of foreign direct investment from i to j. There is also
a ﬁxed cost for the entrepreneur to move her project from i to j, which is denoted as
(1+ri)dij. The expected income when the entrepreneur in country i directly invests




(1 + ri)+c/θi + bi −
¡
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The entrepreneur in country i produces abroad if Uid ≥ Ui =
¡
1+ri¢
fi.U s i n g
CRSR (11) and substituting
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(1 + fi + dij)(1+fi)
+ ηij (20)











(1 + fj + dji)(1+fj)
−ηji (21)
When equalities in (20) and (21) hold, they are depicted in Figure 2 by curves
FDI-out and FDI-in, respectively. The FDI-in c u r v em u s tl i ea b o v et h eFDI-out
curve. For all points on the right side of FDI-out curve, FDI ﬂows from country i
to j, while for all points on the left side of FDI-in curve, FDI ﬂows from j to i.
4 . 1 I sT h e r eS t i l laB y p a s sE ﬀect?
The patterns of capital ﬂow are determined by the relative positions of four boundaries
in Figure 2. We can show that as long as the collective agency costs in country i, ρi,
is larger than ρj by a suﬃcient amount, the complete bypass emerges as the unique
equilibrium. More precisely, if
ρj − ρi < −
bjdji
(1 + fj + dji)(1+fj)
− ηji − τij = CI (22)
then the curve FCF-out is above the curve FDI-in, which implies that both curves
FCF-in and FCF-out are above curves FDI-in and FDI-out.I n t h i s c a s e , t h e
complete bypass is the unique equilibrium.
Let capital/labor ratio of two countries before capital ﬂows, (ki0,kj0), be on the
left side of FCF-in and FDI-in curves, as indicated by point A in Figure 2. Since A
i so nt h el e f ts i d eo fFDI-in curve, FDI will ﬂow into i from j. Expecting that the
ﬂow of FDI from j to i would eventually bring (ki,kj) to the right side of FCF-in
curve and make ﬁnancial capital ﬂowing into country i not proﬁtable, ﬁnancial
20capital does not ﬂow into country i in the ﬁrst place. After (ki,kj) passes FCF-out
curve, two countries then enter into an area of two-way capital ﬂows between curves
FCF-out and FDI-in in which FDI ﬂows from country j to country i, while ﬁnancial
capital ﬂows from i to j. This pattern of two-way ﬂows will continue until all capital
originally in country i leaves the country. In equilibrium the amount of FDI received
by country i is determined by the equilibrium condition of FDI inﬂow, the curve
FDI-in. Similarly, if (ki0,kj0) is on the right side of FDI-out curve, as indicated by
point B, we will also have a complete bypass in the equilibrium.
When ρi is suﬃciently smaller than ρj, an opposite pattern emerges. More
precisely, if
ρj − ρi >
bidij
(1 + fi + dij)(1+fi)
+ ηij + τji = CII (23)
the curve FCF-in is under the curve FDI-out, which implies that both curves
FCF-in and FCF-out are under curves FDI-in and FDI-out (not drawn to avoid
overcrowding the space). The region between curves FDI-out and FCF-in is the
two-way capital ﬂow area. Similar to the above analysis, the capital ﬂow will bring
(ki,kj) into two-way capital ﬂow area in which ﬁnancial capital will ﬂow from j
to i, while FDI will ﬂow from i to j until all capital owned by country j leaves
the country. The amount of FDI received by country j is determined by the curve
FDI-out in this case.
The intuition for the result is as follows: if the diﬀerence in the collective agency
costs between two countries is larger than the costs of international capital ﬂows,
the beneﬁt of bypassing exceeds the cost of capital ﬂows. Thus, it is rational for
investors to bypass poor ﬁnancial institutions and ineﬃcient entrepreneurs at home.
If neither condition (22) nor (23) holds, there will be one-way capital ﬂow, which
we turn into in the next subsection.
214.2 One-Way Capital Flows
We now consider a third scenario in which the cross-country diﬀerence in the
quality of ﬁnancial system/corporate governance is in an intermediate range, or
more precisely,
CI <ρ j − ρi <C II (24)
The condition implies that the FCF-out curve is below the FDI-in curve, and
the FDI-out curve is below the FCF-in curve. The relative positions of the two
outﬂow curves FCF-out and FDI-out are determined by a further comparison of the
values on the right hand sides of (17) and (20), respectively. A similar examination
determines the relative positions of the two inﬂow curves. There are four possible
cases. We depict and analyze in detail one case in Figure 3. The analyses for the
others are similar.
The two inside curves, FCF-in and FDI-out, jointly determine a “no-capital-ﬂow”
zone. If the initial capital allocation (ki0,kj0) is in this zone, as represented by point
C in Figure 3, there is no capital ﬂow between two countries. Note that if the costs
of capital ﬂows increase, the two inﬂow curves would shift to the left and the two
outﬂow curves would shift to the right. Therefore, for suﬃciently large costs, the
zone of “no-capital-ﬂow” would expand so much that any initial (ki0,kj0) would not
lead to capital ﬂows in either direction. If (ki0,kj0) is outside of “no capital ﬂow”
zone, the pattern of capital ﬂows is determined by two inside curves, either FCF-in
or FDI-out, whichever is closer to the starting point.
Let (ki0,kj0) b eo nt h el e f ts i d eo ft h eFDI-in curve, as represented by point A in
Figure 3. In spite of the fact that A is to the left of both FDI-in and FCF-in curves,
because an inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital from j to i would eventually make FDI into
country i not proﬁtable, FDI does not ﬂow into country i in the ﬁrst place and only
ﬁnancial capital ﬂo w i n gi n t oc o u n t r yi would occur. The amount of ﬁnancial capital
22inﬂow is determined by the intersection between the line of Liki+Ljkj = Ki0+Kj0
and the FCF-in curve. Now consider the case in which (ki0,kj0) is on the right side
of the FCF-out curve, as represented by point B. In this case, only FDI ﬂows out
of country i since now FDI-out is the inside curve.
Similar to Section 3, if (ki0,kj0) is to the right of at least one of outﬂow curves,
country i is deﬁned as eﬀectively capital abundant. On the other hand, country i
is eﬀectively labor abundant if (ki0,kj0) i st ot h el e f to fa tl e a s to n eo ft h ei n ﬂow
curves.
We summarize our discussion by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the cross-country diﬀerence in the collective agency costs is suﬃciently
large (relative to the costs of capital ﬂows, i.e., either condition (22) or (23) holds),
the unique equilibrium in the world capital market will be characterized by two-way
capital ﬂows that completely bypass the ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system/weak corporate
governance. Otherwise there will be one-way capital ﬂows. Either ﬁnancial capital
or FDI will ﬂow out of an eﬀectively capital abundant country into an eﬀectively
labor abundant one.
Intuitively, this proposition implies that suﬃciently large marginal costs to capital
ﬂows could prevent two-way capital ﬂows (and hence the bypass of ineﬃcient domestic
ﬁnancial institution/corporate governance) from taking place. This is not the only
way to break the complete bypass result. If instead of assuming a constant marginal
cost of capital ﬂows, let us hypothesize that the cost is convex. For example, τij
and ηji are increasing in the amount of capital ﬂows, there will in general still be
two-way capital ﬂows but no complete bypass even if the costs of capital mobility is
not large. In this case, the FCF-out curve shifts down as ﬁnancial capital ﬂows out,
while the FDI-in c u r v es h i f t su pa sF D Iﬂows in. If the amount of capital ﬂow is
suﬃciently large, the FCF-out c u r v ew i l le v e n t u a l l ym o v eb e l o wt h eFDI-in curve,
which terminates the complete bypass. If entrepreneurs are heterogeneous, as in the
23model of Ju and Wei (2006), the marginal entrepreneur beneﬁts less with more FDI
ﬂows into foreign country. This also prevents a complete bypass from occurring (but
still generates two-way capital ﬂows).
4.3 Comparative Statics
We now trace out how a change in either the collective agency costs ρ or property
rights protection λ aﬀects the patterns of capital ﬂows. This essentially involves
discussing the earlier key results from a diﬀerent angle. We focus on the composition
of capital ﬂows for country i,a n dl e tc o u n t r yj be the rest of the world. A key feature
to bear in mind is that the locations of the FDI-in and FDI-out curves are both
aﬀected by λ but not by ρ,w h e r e a st h eFCF-in and FCF-out curves would both
shift to the right when either λ rises or ρ declines. To preview the results, we will
show that as the ﬁnancial system/corporate governance of a country improves, it
would shift from importing to exporting FDI, but would shift from exporting to
importing ﬁnancial capital. As property rights protection strengthens, the expected
marginal product of capital in the country increases. As a result, the net exports
of both FDI and ﬁnancial capital would decline (or the inﬂows of both FDI and
ﬁnancial capital would increase).
Let us consider a gradual improvement in the collective quality of the country’s
ﬁnancial system/corporate governance from the worst possible value to the best one
(e.g., from ρi = ∞ to ρi =0 ) while holding λi constant. To illustrate, let (ki0,kj0)
be at point A i nF i g u r e2s oc o u n t r yi is eﬀectively labor abundant. There are four
zones of ρi to be considered. Using condition (22), let ρ1 be the cutoﬀ point of ρi
such that the FCF-out and FDI-in curves coincide, or
ρ1 = ρj +
bjdji
(1 + fj + dji)(1+fj)
+ ηji + τij (25)
Suppose ρi ∈ [ρ1,∞), both FCF-in and FCF-out curves must be above FDI-in and
24FDI-out curves. This corresponds to the case depicted in Figure 2. In this case, the
domestic ﬁnancial institution/corporate governance is completely bypassed. The
exact amounts of ﬁnancial capital ﬂow and FDI can be found as, FCF = Ki0,
and FDI = −Ki∗
1 where Ki∗
1 is determined by the intersection between the line
of Liki + Ljkj = Ki0 + Kj0 and the FDI-in curve. As long as ρi is in the region
of [ρ1,∞), a change in the value of ρi has no eﬀect on the amount and composition
of the capital ﬂows. This is depicted in the far left part of Figure 4 (ab and a0b0).
In the second zone when ρi ∈ [ρ2,ρ 1), with ρ2 being the cutoﬀ point of ρi such
that the FCF-in and FDI-in curves coincide, or
ρi
2 = ρj +
bjdji
(1 + fj + dji)(1+fj)
+ ηji − τji, (26)
the FCF-out curve is now below the FDI-in curve (indicated by FCF’-out in Figure
2). The pattern of capital ﬂows changes from a complete bypass to one-way ﬂows.
That is, only FDI ﬂows into country i (recall that the pattern of one-way ﬂows is
determined by the inside curve). Financial capital outﬂow drops from Ki0 to zero.
The capital stock in country i now is Ki∗





capital ﬂow is determined by the inside inﬂow curve now, further decreasing ρi until
FCF-in and FDI-in coincide has no eﬀect on capital ﬂows. This is represented by
the middle left portion of Figure 4 (cd and c0d0).
In the third zone when ρi ∈ [ρ3,ρ 2), with ρ3 being the cutoﬀ point of ρi such
that the FCF-in and FDI-out curves coincide, or
ρi
3 = ρj −
bidij
(1 + fi + dij)(1+fi)
− ηij − τji, (27)
we switch from one-way FDI inﬂow to one-way ﬁnancial capital inﬂow as analyzed
in Figure 3 since now FCF-in curve is the inside inﬂow curve. The FDI inﬂow
drops to zero, whereas the ﬁnancial inﬂow FCF = −(Ki∗
2 − Ki0). The level of
capital stock in this zone Ki∗
2 is determined by the intersection between the line of
25Liki + Ljkj = Ki0 + Kj0 and the FCF-in curve. Note that the capital stock in
this zone is higher than in the second zone or Ki∗
2 >K i∗
1 since FCF-in is under
FDI-in now. Ki∗
2 increases as ρi decreases until FCF-in and FDI-out coincide. This
is represented by the middle right portion of Figure 4 (ef and de0).
In the fourth zone when ρi ∈ [0,ρ 3), we switch from one-way ﬁnancial capital
inﬂo wb a c kt oap a t t e r no ft w o - w a yﬂows (but with opposite signs from zone one).
Now country i has better collective ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance.
All of Kj0 ﬂows into country i. Thus, FCF = −Kj0 < −(Ki∗
2 − Ki0). The amount
of FDI ﬂowing out of country i, FDI = Ki∗
3 , where Ki∗
3 is determined by the
intersection between the line of Liki + Ljkj = Ki0 + Kj0 and the FDI-out curve.
Further decreasing ρi has no eﬀect on capital ﬂows. This is depicted by the far right
portion of Figure 4 (gh and f0g0).
The comparative statics can be recapitulated by looking at Figure 4. 0 < 1/ρi <
∞ is depicted in horizontal axis, while FCF and FDI are represented by vertical
axis. As 1/ρi increases, the collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate
governance is improving. The eﬀect of changing 1/ρi on ﬁnancial capital ﬂow is
represented by the line abcdefgh, while the eﬀect on FDI is represented by the line
a0b0c0d0de0f0g0. It is clear that as the collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and
corporate governance improves, net FDI outﬂow increases, but net ﬁnancial outﬂow
decreases. Similar analysis can be conducted when country i is eﬀectively capital
abundant and the same result of comparative statics holds. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 3 The eﬀects of changing collective quality of ﬁnancial institution
and corporate governance on ﬁnancial capital ﬂow and FDI are opposite. As the
collective quality of ﬁnancial institution and corporate governance improves, net
FDI outﬂow increases, but net ﬁnancial outﬂow decreases.
Now we turn into the eﬀect of a change in property rights protection (changing
λi), while holding ρi constant. Examining conditions (17), (18), (20) and (21), we
26know that changing λi does not aﬀect the relative positions of the four threshold
curves. Thus, the pattern of capital ﬂow is not aﬀected by changing λi. However, the
increase in λi shifts all FCF-in, FCF-out, FDI-in and FDI-out curves to the right.
Therefore, FDI inﬂow and ﬁnancial inﬂow into country i are increased, while FDI
outﬂow and ﬁnancial outﬂow from country i are reduced. Summarizing we have:
Proposition 4 As property rights protection improves, both the net FDI outﬂow
and the net ﬁnancial outﬂow decline.
Propositions 3 and 4 show the contrasting eﬀects of better property rights
protection versus better ﬁnancial development on FDI. The intuition is straightforward:
better property rights protection increases expected marginal product of capital and
interest rate, leading to more inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital and FDI; a better ﬁnancial
system, on the other hand, encourages more ﬁnancial capital inﬂow (or less capital
ﬂight), which decreases marginal product of capital and therefore reduces inward
FDI.
5 Welfare Impact of Capital Flows
Does ﬁnancial globalization enhance welfare for individual economies and for the
world as a whole? This is the subject of this section. We measure a change in
social welfare by the occurrence of a potential Pareto improvement,w h i c hi nt u r n
can be represented by a change in aggregate income. For simplicity, we will focus on
the case of a frictionless world. A key result is that the welfare eﬀect may diverge
between ﬁnancially sophisticated and ﬁnancially backward economies.
5.1 World Welfare
We ﬁrst examine the world as a whole. We start by showing that the aggregate
income in ﬁnancial autarky equals the sum of aggregate output produced and the
27capital stock left at the end of period 2.7 Note that the number of entrepreneurs
N = K/z. Assume that all ﬁnancial intermediation costs, (c/θ)K, are distributed
to labor, and all license fees paid by entrepreneurs, (1 + r)fN, are distributed to
labor as well. The aggregate income in the country, W, is the sum of expected labor












+ β +( 1+r)
i
K = λwL + λRK = λF(L,K)+λK (28)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h er e s u l tt h a tβ =( 1+r)f/z, and equations (2) and (11), for
the above derivations. Thus, with the depreciation rate set at zero, the aggregate
income equals the sum of total output produced and capital left at the end of period
2.
Let us use superscripts 0 and 1 to denote variables before and after free capital





. A social planner of the world will
choose capital stocks,K i and Kj, to maximize the expected world total output.
That is,
max





s.t. Ki + Kj = Ki0 + Kj0
O n ec a ns e et h a tt h eﬁrst order condition of the above optimization problem is
exactly the same as (15). Therefore, Ki∗ determined by condition (15) maximizes
the expected world aggregate income. One can also check that the world aggregate
7As in the leading graduate-level textbook for international macroeconomics (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 1996, Chapter 1), the capital stock is eaten after date 2 production. Thus welfare is
measured by the sum of the second-period GNP and the capital stock.
28income with free capital ﬂows equals W∗. As long as Ki0 diﬀers from Ki∗ so that
the net capital ﬂow is not zero, the world as a whole must strictly beneﬁt from free
capital ﬂo w sa st h ee ﬃciency of global capital allocation improves.
To put it diﬀerently, ﬁnancial globalization in this case is a substitute for reforms
of weak domestic ﬁnancial institutions/corporate governance in developing countries.
As the inferior ﬁnancial system is completely bypassed by saving and investment,
return on savings becomes higher, and capital mobility equates the expected marginal
products of capital across all countries.
5.2 National Welfare
Unlike the world welfare, national welfare may not be higher with ﬁnancial globalization
for every individual economy. To be precise, we will show that the country with a
strong ﬁnancial institution/corporate governance always beneﬁts from free capital
mobility. However, the country with a weak ﬁnancial system/corporate governance
may lose out. For the latter country, the strength of its property rights protection
also plays a role in determining how likely it may beneﬁtf r o mﬁnancial globalization.
To see some of the intuition, recall from the capital revenue sharing rule (11)
that the expected marginal product of capital has to be distributed among ﬁnancial
investors, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs. Free international capital
ﬂows and the resulting bypass of the ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system transfers the revenue
of ﬁnancial intermediation and management from country i (the one with a weak
ﬁnancial system) to j (the one with a strong ﬁnancial system). The welfare impact
on country i, therefore, is determined by the trade-oﬀ between an eﬃciency gain from
capital mobility and a revenue loss in ﬁnancial intermediation and entrepreneurial
pay.
295.2.1 The Country with a Weak Financial Sector
In general, the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation and business entry have both a rent
and a waste (deadweight loss) component. We denote φi
1 and φi
2,w h e r eφi
1,φ i
2 ≤ 1,
as the fractions of the intermediation and business entry costs that are wasted,
respectively. Formally, the expected aggregate income in country i in ﬁnancial
autarky is:








With free capital movement, all Ki0 are intermediated through the foreign
ﬁnancial system. Suppose Ki∗ is the amount of FDI that enters country i from j.
Note that the interest rates are equalized across countries with free capital mobility,








from (15). The expected aggregate income in
country i under free capital ﬂows becomes:
Wi1 = λiwi1Li +
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1+ri1¢









Ki0 − ρjKi0 (31)












= A − µijKi0 = A − B (32)
where µij = ρj − φi
1c/θi − φi
2βi. The ﬁrst term in squared bracket in (32), denoted
by A, represents the standard triangle gain from free capital ﬂows in the neoclassic
theory. More precisely,





















In Figure 5, expression (33) is depicted by the triangle below the curve F0
k(.) if
Ki∗ >K i0, or the triangle above the curve F0
k(.) if Ki∗ <K i0. In either case, it is
always positive.
The second term on the right hand side of equality (32), denoted by B,represents
country i’s revenue loss from a complete bypass. In Figure 5, it is depicted by the
rectangle B. The overall welfare impact of ﬁnancial globalization for country i is
determined by the trade-oﬀ between A and B. As an example, if Ki0 = Ki∗ and
φi
1 = φi
2 =0so that net capital ﬂows happen to be zero with ﬁnancial globalization
(but the gross capital ﬂows could be massive), and the fees paid for ﬁnancial
intermediation and business licenses before ﬁnancial globalization are pure rents
in country i,t h e nA =0and B = ρjKi0. In this example, free capital mobility is
guaranteed to reduce the welfare of country i. On the other hand, if φi
1 = φi
2 =1so
all intermediation cost and license fee are deadweight loss in ﬁnancial autarky,B
then becomes negative since ρj <ρ i. In this case, free capital mobility must improve
country i’s welfare.
As indicated in Figure 5, the magnitude of the triangle gain from capital ﬂows,
A, is determined by the size of net capital ﬂow, Ki∗−Ki0. Let country i be eﬀectively
labor abundant. Using (15), we can show that Ki∗ − Ki0 becomes larger if λi is
larger. Therefore, the triangle gain from free capital ﬂows, A, becomes larger if the
protection of property rights in country i is stronger. Therefore, the country with
aw e a kﬁnancial system is more likely to beneﬁt from free capital mobility if its
property rights protection is strong.
315.2.2 The Country with a Strong Financial Sector
We turn now to the welfare impact of ﬁnancial globalization for country j -t h eo n e
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where Kj1 = Ki0+Kj0−Ki∗ is the capital stock in country j with capital mobility.
We have used the fact that
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the above expression. Thus we have
























The ﬁrst term in the right hand side of (34) is again the triangle gain from capital
ﬂows, which is always positive. The second term is the rent (i.e., not wasted) part
of the revenue transferred to country j from country i due to the bypass eﬀect.
In contrast to the previous case, the second term is also positive. Therefore, the
country with the good ﬁnancial system/corporate governance must beneﬁtf r o m
global capital mobility. To summarize we have:
Proposition 5 (A) In a frictionless world, the inferior ﬁnancial system/corporate
governance is completely bypassed. All savings are served by the world’s best ﬁnancial
system and the world’s ﬁr s tb e s te ﬃciency is reached through free international
capital ﬂows. (B) The country with a strong ﬁnancial institution and corporate
32governance gains unambiguously from global capital mobility. (C) The country with
aw e a kﬁnancial institution and corporate governance, however, many not beneﬁt
from ﬁnancial globalization, depending on the trade oﬀ b e t w e e na ne ﬃciency gain
from better capital allocation and a loss of revenue previously accrued to domestic
entrepreneurs and ﬁnancial institution. If the country is eﬀectively labor abundant,
the stronger the protection of property rights, the more likely the country would
beneﬁt from free capital mobility.
These theoretical predictions are consistent with the observation that advanced
countries like the United States tend to be more enthusiastic about pushing for
capital account openness around the world than many developing countries. Furthermore,
they are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings, reviewed in Kose, Prasad, Rogoﬀ,
and Wei (2006), that not all developing countries beneﬁtf r o mﬁnancial globalization,
and that those developing countries with strong property rights protection are more
likely to beneﬁt from it. In addition, the model is consistent with the idea that it is
better to liberalize FDI inﬂows than capital outﬂows.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Net ﬁnancial capital and net FDI often go in opposite directions. Developed countries
with an eﬃcient ﬁnancial system, strong corporate governance, and strong property
rights protection are often net exporters of FDI but net importers of ﬁnancial capital.
Developing countries with an ineﬃcient ﬁnancial system, weak corporate governance
but an intermediate level of property rights protection tend to exhibit an opposite
pattern, exporting ﬁnancial capital, but importing FDI on net. If the diﬀerence
in the quality of ﬁnancial system/corporate governance between the two sets of
countries is suﬃciently large (relative to the costs of cross-border capital ﬂows), the
theory developed in this paper suggests that the inferior ﬁnancial system/corporate
governance can be completely bypassed by two-way capital ﬂows. In a sense,
33ﬁnancial globalization is a substitute for reforms of domestic ﬁnancial sector as
capital can be put to the most eﬃcient use in this case even without domestic
ﬁnancial reforms. However, the net welfare eﬀect on a developing country with
aw e a kﬁnancial system may not always be positive, if the fees paid for ﬁnancial
intermediation and business entry have a rent component. While the welfare eﬀect
for a developing country may be ambiguous, the model suggests that the net eﬀect
is more likely to be positive the stronger is the quality of property rights protection.
Unlike the neoclassical theory that equates the expected marginal product of
capital to interest rate, the sharing rule on capital revenue derived in this paper
states that the expected marginal product of capital is the sum of the interest rate,
the cost of ﬁnancial intermediation, and the cost of weak corporate governance.
In other words, the weaker the ﬁnancial system or the corporate governance in a
country, the greater the gap between the interest rate and the expected marginal
product of capital. Also, while risk sharing is an explanation in the literature
for two-way portfolio capital ﬂows across countries, this paper provides a new
explanation based on diﬀerences in institutional quality (even with risk neutral
investors).
This simple model is a ﬁrst step towards a framework for understanding the
composition of international capital ﬂows and its connection with domestic institutions.
There are still many areas in which the model can be enriched. First, while the
current analysis groups quality of ﬁnancial system and quality of corporate governance
together, future work could investigate their separate implications. For example,
if one allows for international direct investment in the banking sector, then the
eﬃciency of a developing country’s banking sector (though not the strength of its
corporate governance) may be improved partially. If one introduces joint venture
between foreign and local entrepreneurs, perhaps the quality of local corporate
governance can be partially modiﬁed as well. Second, while the current model
lumps together international portfolio equity and portfolio debt ﬂows under the
34rubric of ﬁnancial capital, it would be useful to separate them. Third, the quality
of domestic ﬁnancial sector and the eﬃciency of corporate governance are two
parameters in the current model. It would be useful to endogenize them, and
in particular, to discuss ways in which they may respond to global capital ﬂows.
Fourth, a systematic empirical investigation can be conducted to examine whether
and how ﬁnancial institutions and property rights protection may aﬀect patterns of
international ﬂows diﬀerently. Given our theory, one needs to have information on
barriers to cross-border ﬁnancial capital ﬂows and FDI. Comprehensive information
on these variable is not yet available. These could be fruitful directions for future
research.
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Table 1: Patterns of Capital Flows by Country Groups, 1990-2004 








Per Capita Net 
FDI Outflows 
 
(average within the group)
Per Capita Net 
Financial Capital Outflows
 
(average within the group) 
1990  Developed Countries  165  -1564 
  Emerging Markets  -756  1541 
  Other Developing Countries  -226  -483 
      
1995  Developed Countries  275  -1773 
  Emerging Markets  -1462  2184 
  Other Developing Countries  -273  -437 
      
2000  Developed Countries  1204  -2486 
  Emerging Markets  -1668  3680 
  Other Developing Countries  -406  -281 
      
2004  Developed Countries  1120  -1382 
  Emerging Markets  -1671  5556 
  Other Developing Countries  -569  -138 
Notes:  
 
1) Source: Authors’ calculations based on the database described in “The External Wealth of Nations Mark 
II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970-2004”, by Philip R. Lane and 
Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, IMF Working Paper 06/69, 2006. Population data is from the IMF’s 
“International Financial Statistics”.  
 
2) Variable Definitions: 
Per capita net FDI outflows = (FDI Asset – FDI Liability)/population 
Per capita net financial capital outflows = [(total foreign asset-FDI asset)-(total foreign liability-FDI 
liability)]/population 
Numbers are averaged across countries within the group. Negative numbers indicate inflows. 
 
3) Country Groups (based on IMF Occasional Paper 220, “Effects of Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence,” Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei, and 
Ayhan Kose (2003), Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.) 
21 Developed Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
   22 Emerging Markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, 
Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. 
33 Other Developing Countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia, and Uruguay. 
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Figure 4: Comparative Statistics – Patterns of Capital Flows as a 
Function of Quality of Financial System/Corporate Governance 
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Figure 5: Welfare Effect of Financial Globalization 